www.hicn.org Civil Conflict, Sex Ratio and Intimate Partner Violence in Rwanda 1 by Giulia La Mattina
 
 
 
 
H  i  C  N  Households in Conflict Network 
The Institute of Development Studies - at the University of Sussex - Falmer - Brighton - BN1 9RE 
www.hicn.org 
 
 
 
 Civil Conflict, Sex Ratio and Intimate Partner 
Violence in Rwanda1 
 
 
 Giulia La Mattina2 
 
 
HiCN Working Paper 175 
 
April 2014 (first draft January 2012) 
 
Abstract:  This  paper  examines  the  long-term  impact  of  civil  conflict  on  intimate  partner 
violence  and  women’s  decision-making  power  using  post-genocide  data  from  Rwanda. 
Household survey data collected 11 years after the genocide indicate that women who became 
married after the genocide experienced significantly increased intimate partner violence and 
decreased decision-making power relative to women who became married before. The effect 
was greater for women in localities with high genocide intensity. I find that variation in the 
marriage market sex ratio across localities and over time explains part of the effect of the 
genocide on intimate partner violence. 
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1.  Introduction  
Intimate partner violence against women is a widespread phenomenon that spans across 
societies. It affects one out of three women aged 15 and over throughout the world (Devries et al. 
2013). The consequences extend beyond women’s safety; intimate partner violence has negative 
consequences for the health of both women and children (Campbell 2002). For instance, Aizer 
(2011) shows that experiencing violence during pregnancy reduces birth weight. These effects 
are costly—in 2003,  4.1 billion dollars were spent on medical care services for victims of 
intimate partner violence in the United States (CDC 2003). Despite the pervasive and harmful 
nature of intimate partner violence, only recently have economists started considering it as a 
research topic (Tauchen et al. 1991; Farmer and Tiefenthaler 1997).
1 
Intimate partner violence can also inform economists about the functioning of the household 
because it  may  reflect the distribution of bargaining power within the family (Farmer and 
Tiefenthaler 1997;  Aizer 2010).
2  As has been shown, intra-household allocation affects 
investment in children’s human capital  (Thomas 1990; Duflo 2003). Therefore, identifying 
factors that shift intra-household allocation could help to reduce differences in human capital. 
Intra-household allocation may be affected by numerous economic, demographic and 
institutional factors, such as women’s income opportunities, women’s property rights and 
marriage market conditions (Grossbard-Shechtman 1993; Duflo 2003; Porter 2007; Wang 2014).  
This paper examines the long-term impact of civil conflicts on intimate partner violence 
using data from post-genocide Rwanda. In 1994, an estimated 800,000 individuals out of a 
population of 7 million were killed in just three months. Because the Rwandan genocide was a 
short and high-intensity conflict, it deeply affected the structure of the population. For instance, 
census data indicate that the sex ratio (men to women) for the 18-50 age groups decreased from 
.95 in 1991 to .88 in 2002. Higher male mortality during the genocide, male incarceration and 
                                                 
1  Tauchen et al. (1991) and Farmer and Tiefenthaler  (1997) were the first to study intimate partner 
violence in economics. An incomplete list of recent contributions includes Bloch and Rao (2002), Aizer 
(2010), Jacoby and Mansuri (2010), Card and Dahl (2011), Hjort and Villanger (2011), Chin (2012), 
Sekhri and Storeygard (2012), Heath (2012), Hidrobo and Fernald (2013), Hidrobo et al. (2013), Bobonis 
et al. (2013) and Chin (2013).  
2  Farmer and Tiefenthaler (1997) and Aizer (2010) incorporate domestic violence in a household 
bargaining model. Factors that improve the woman’s threat point, such as increases in the woman’s 
potential earnings outside the household, enhance her bargaining power in the marriage and decrease the 
risk of domestic violence. 3 
out-migration  contributed to such decline (Verpoorten  2005; Straus  2006;  de Walque and 
Verwimp 2010). Therefore, the Rwandan context provides an ideal opportunity to study the 
impact of armed conflict on intimate partner violence through the previously overlooked channel 
of the marriage market.
3    
Identifying factors that may cause intimate partner violence in post-conflict societies is 
crucial to improving women’s and children’s well-being. Several studies have shown that civil 
conflicts have negative long-term implications for children’s health and education (Akresh et al. 
2012; Justino et al. 2011; León 2012; Minoiu and Shemyakina 2012).
4 Through intimate partner 
violence and intra-household allocation, the negative effects of civil conflicts on human capital 
may even extend to future generations not directly affected by wars.  
Studying the effect of civil conflict on intimate partner violence in Rwanda is challenging 
because data on domestic violence were collected for the first time in 2005 (11 years after the 
genocide).
5 In this paper, I exploit both variation in genocide intensity across localities and time 
variation in women’s years of marriage. I use both these variations to test whether the conflict 
affected the risk of intimate partner violence in couples that formed after the end of the genocide, 
relative  to  couples  that formed before.  By combining  recently released customary courts’ 
records, census data and a household survey, I create a novel data set. I improve on pre-existing 
matches by using ArcGIS as well as a merge based on localities’ names to combine the three 
data sets.  
In my study, I find that becoming married after the genocide increased the probability of 
intimate partner violence for women, relative to women who became married before the conflict. 
In addition, I find that the effect was greater in localities with a high genocide intensity than in 
localities with low genocide intensity. The estimated effect is quite large: an increase of one 
standard deviation in genocide intensity in the commune of residence increases the probability of 
                                                 
3 Intimate partner violence against women is common and generally tolerated in Rwanda, as reflected by 
proverbs that state “a woman who is not yet battered is not a real woman” (Human Rights Watch 1996) 
and “a girl is ready food to be eaten any time” (USAID). 
4 Justino et al. (2011) and Leon (2012) analyze the long-term effects of civil conflict on education in 
Timor Leste and Peru; Akresh et al. (2012) and Minoiu and Shemyakina (2012) show that children who 
were exposed to civil wars in Ethiopia and Cote d’Ivoire had lower height-for-age z-score compared to 
similar children who were not exposed to the conflict. Because children’s height is an important 
determinant of later educational and labor market outcomes, these effects are likely to be long-lived. 
5 Data on domestic violence was first collected in Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) in the early 
2000s (Kishor 2005).  4 
spousal violence by 5.6 percentage points. This effect is equivalent to an increase of 30% with 
respect to the sample mean.
6 The results are robust to a falsification test using domestic violence 
between the woman’s parents as a dependent variable to test for pre-existing differential trends in 
intimate partner violence across localities. Furthermore, I show that the results are robust to 
using the woman’s year of birth as an instrument for her year of marriage, to relieve concerns 
that the timing of marriage is endogenous. I also show that the results are not driven by selection 
into marriage or an increase in reporting of intimate partner violence in localities with higher 
genocide intensity after the genocide.  
Upon investigation, the most plausible mechanism for this finding is a change in the balance 
of the sexes in the marriage market (sex ratio), which is an important determinant of the relative 
well-being of men and women within the marriage (Becker 1973 and 1981).
7 I show that women 
who faced higher competition for grooms at the time of marriage—as measured by a lower sex 
ratio—have a higher probability of intimate partner violence. When I include both the sex ratio 
and the index of genocide intensity in the regression, the coefficient estimate on the index of 
genocide intensity declines and becomes statistically insignificant, while the coefficient on the 
sex ratio stays negative and statistically significant. This result indicates that the decline in the 
sex ratio explains at least one-third of the effect of the genocide on intimate partner violence. 
Showing the first evidence of a relationship between sex ratio and intimate partner violence is 
the primary contribution of this paper. 
Furthermore, I show that intimate partner violence is not the only aspect in which women 
experienced worse marital outcomes post-genocide. Women who married after the genocide in 
localities where the conflict was more intense are less likely to have the final say on several 
issues, including the allocation of household income, relative to women who married before the 
end of the conflict and women in localities with low genocide intensity. These results provide 
supporting evidence for the hypothesis that the genocide affected intra-household allocation 
                                                 
6 This estimate means that women who live in a locality in the 75
th percentile of genocide intensity are on 
average 8.2 percentage points more likely to experience domestic violence than women who live in a 
locality in the 25
th percentile of genocide intensity. This effect represents an increase of 43% in the 
sample mean. 
7 At the national level, the sex ratio for the 18-50 age group decreased from .95 in 1991 to .88 in 2002. 
This implies that the “surplus of women” increased by a factor of 2.5. 5 
through the marriage market. By affecting women’s decision-making power, the conflict could 
affect the human capital of future generations. 
Finally, I consider alternative mechanisms for the main result: increased spousal violence. 
For instance, other effects of genocide might have increased men’s propensity to commit spousal 
violence, such as a lack of social order or increased prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder 
(World Bank 2011; Cesur and Sabia 2013). I show that these mechanisms are likely not driving 
the results. First, I would expect increased traumatic stress disorder to increase spousal violence 
for all women, regardless of their time of marriage. As such, these mechanisms do not explain 
the greater increase in intimate partner violence for women who married after the genocide 
relative to women who married before. Additionally, a retrospective panel data set created using 
women’s self-reported history of domestic violence indicates that the genocide did not increase 
the risk of spousal violence for women who married before the outbreak of the conflict. Second, 
I would expect the lack of social order to increase any type of violent behavior, not only intimate 
partner violence. I rule out this conjecture by showing that the genocide did not increase the 
probability of being a victim of violence by individuals other than partners. Altogether, these 
results dismiss trauma-induced violent behavior and the lack of social order as potential 
mechanism behind the main results.  
This paper contributes to an extensive literature base on the effects of marriage market sex 
ratios.
8  Because sex ratios may in some cases  be endogenous, studying their effects is 
challenging. As such, previous research has exploited changes in the sex ratio caused by wars to 
estimate its impact on marital and bargaining outcome.
9 This paper uses the plausibly exogenous 
variation in the marriage market sex ratio caused by the Rwandan genocide to shed light on the 
relationship between sex ratios and intimate partner violence. To my knowledge, this is the first 
paper to investigate that relationship. 
                                                 
8 See for example Bergstrom and Lam (1988), Angrist (2002), Amuedo-Dorantes and Grossbard (2007), 
Brainerd (2007), Porter (2007), Abramitzky et al. (2011), Francis (2011), Bethmann and Kvasnicka 
(2013), Lafortune (2013), Edlund et al. (2013), Schindler and Verpoorten (2013). 
9 Abramitzky et al. (2011) exploited changes in sex ratio caused by male mortality during WWI in France; 
Brainerd (2007) exploited changes in sex ratio related to WWII in Russia; Schindler and Verpoorten 
(2013) used changes in sex ratio associated with the genocide to study the effect of sex ratios on marital 
outcomes in Rwanda.   6 
Besides this main contribution, this paper also adds to the growing literature on the effects 
of civil conflicts on gender inequality.
10 Two recent studies analyze the effect of low intensity, 
short duration conflicts on intimate partner violence in Latin America. Calderón et al. (2011) find 
that displaced women in Colombia are more likely to work and contribute to household income 
but are also more likely to experience intimate partner violence. Gallegos and Gutierrez (2011) 
use data from Peru to show that women who were exposed to civil war events at a young age are 
more likely to become victims of domestic violence and to be tolerant of domestic abuse. Unlike 
these studies, this paper deals with a high intensity, short duration conflict that dramatically 
affected the demographics of the country. This  context  allows me to explore mechanisms 
through which civil conflicts affect the marriage market and intimate partner violence.  
This study is also closely related to projects that study the impact of the Rwandan genocide. 
Previous research has found that the  genocide had a direct negative effect on income and 
consumption (Justino and Verwimp 2013; Serneels and Verpoorten 2013). Moreover, it affected 
income indirectly by reducing schooling and height for cohorts that were directly exposed to the 
genocide  (Akresh and de Walque 2008; Aguero and Deolalikar 2012). The genocide also 
affected age at first marriage and age at first birth (Jayaraman et al. 2009) and fertility (Schindler 
and Brueck 2011).
11 In addition to providing the first evidence on the effect of the genocide on 
intimate partner violence, this paper uses different and newly matched data to study the effect of 
the genocide on family outcomes.
12 Some of the previous studies used death within the family, 
house damage or land loss as  proxies to represent  measures of exposure to the conflict. 
Conversely, this paper uses recently released data obtained from the records of the gacaca courts 
to measure conflict intensity in the locality of residence. This is helpful because the genocide 
may  have affected intimate partner  violence through mechanisms that go beyond household 
victimization. I also improve on previous research by conducting the analysis at the commune 
level rather than at the province level.
13 The commune level is a finer, more accurate unit of 
analysis, which improves precision and reduces measurement error associated with larger 
                                                 
10 This literature was recently summarized by Buvinic et al. (2013). 
11 The paper is also related to studies that investigated the impact of civil conflicts on marriage-related 
outcomes in different contexts. See for example Shemyakina (2013). 
12 Finnoff (2012) analyzes the cross-sectional correlates of domestic violence in post-genocide Rwanda 
using the 2005 DHS. She shows that women who work for a wage and whose husbands do not work are 
more likely to be victims of domestic sexual violence in post-genocide Rwanda. 
13 Serneels and Verpoorten also 2013 conducted the analysis at the commune level.  7 
regions. Finally, in another differentiation from previous studies, I distinguish between measures 
of sex ratios that include or exclude the prison population; I find that higher incarceration rates 
worsen the negative effects of gender imbalances.
14 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a historical background for 
the Rwandan genocide; section 3 describes the data used; section 4 outlines the empirical 
strategy; section 5 presents the results; section 6 discusses evidence of various mechanisms that 
affect the outcomes; and section 7 concludes.  
2. Background 
This section provides a background for the social and historical context  in which the 
Rwandan genocide took place.  
The population of Rwanda is divided between Hutus and Tutsis. Before the genocide, Tutsis 
accounted for 8% of the population.
15 Traditionally, these group titles reflected differences in 
economic activity and socioeconomic status rather than differences in tribes (Straus 2006). In 
fact, before colonialism, the two ethnic categories were to some extent fluid; it was even possible 
to move from one group to the other as a form of upward or downward social mobility (Prunier 
1995; Straus 2006). Hutus and Tutsis did not live in isolated communities, as shown by data 
collected before the genocide. They  spoke  the same language, lived  in the same localities, 
practiced the same religion and intermarried (Prunier 1995; Straus 2006). Moreover, they had 
similar family and marriage outcomes as measured by marriage rates, sex ratio, labor force 
participation among women, number of children and frequency of polygamous unions. In sum, 
evidence suggests that gender roles were not different between Hutus and Tutsis. This is 
especially important for this study, given that I do not observe ethnicity in my data.  
Belgian  colonial officers reinforced the existing differences in socioeconomic status 
between Hutus and Tutsis and transformed them into race categories (Straus 2006). After 
Rwanda became independent in 1962, Hutus initiated anti-Tutsi violence. As a result, thousands 
of Tutsis went to exile in neighboring countries, where they began a rebel movement named 
Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). In 1990, the RPF started a civil war against the Hutu–dominated 
                                                 
14 This result is consistent with studies that demonstrate the negative effect of incarceration on women’s 
outcomes in the United States (Charles and Luoh 2010; Mechoulan 2011). 
15 Data on ethnicity were not collected after the genocide.  8 
government that lasted until August 1993, when the two parties signed an agreement (Straus 
2006).  
The political and social tension between Hutus and Tutsis continued to escalate during the 
period that preceded the genocide. On April 6, 1994, the Rwandan president, Habyarimana, died 
in an aviation accident in Kigali (Prunier 1995; Straus 2006). The extremist fringe quickly took 
advantage of the accident, took control of the country and instigated mass violence against the 
Tutsi population and, to a lesser extent, moderate Hutus. The ethnic violence quickly spread 
from the capital to the other cities and the rural regions. The radio fomented a large fraction of 
the civilian population to participate in the killings (Prunier 1995; Gourevitch 1998; Straus 2006; 
and Yanagizawa-Drott 2012). In just 100 days, an estimated 800,000 people out of a population 
of 7 million were killed. The genocide ended on July 17, 1994.  
Economists have previously examined the characteristics of the genocide victims, such as 
ethnicity, gender, education and socioeconomic status. Verpoorten (2005) argued that 77% of the 
Tutsi population of Rwanda was killed. Additionally, she found that thousands of Hutus were 
massacred. De Walque and Verwimp (2010) investigated the characteristics of genocide victims 
using sibling mortality data included in the 2000 Rwanda DHS. They showed that educated adult 
men with an urban background were more likely to die in 1994. Other authors reported that men 
were more likely than women to die during the genocide (Gourevitch 1998; Des Forges 1999; 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, National Census Service 2003). Generally, these 
studies suggest that the genocide might have affected the marriage market by reducing both the 
sex ratio and average educational attainment for men. 
 After the genocide, the marriage market sex ratio declined dramatically. This happened for 
three main reasons: higher male mortality during the conflict (Gourevitch 1998; Des Forges 
1999; Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, National Census Service 2003; de Walque 
and Verwimp 2010), higher male incarceration and higher male outmigration because of higher 
male participation in the killings (Verpoorten 2005; Straus 2006).
16  Figure 2 illustrates the 
decline in the sex ratio—defined as the relative number of men to women—by age in 1991 and 
                                                 
16 The fact that the most perpetrators were men is reflected in the gender composition of the prison 
population after the genocide. According to the 1991 Census, 0.11% of the population lived in prison in 
1991. This proportion skyrocketed ten years later: in 2002, 1.3% of the population was living in prison. 
More than 95% of those living in prison in 2002 were male. 9 
2002. The figure clearly shows a large decline in the relative number of men to women aged 20 
to 45. 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The analysis in this paper requires data on intimate partner violence and women’s 
characteristics, as well as measures of conflict intensity and data on the marriage market. This 
section discusses the data and the matching method used to combine the various data sets 
together. 
3.1.  Variables and Summary Statistics 
3.1.1.  Data on Genocide Intensity 
Measures of genocide intensity were obtained from the records of the gacaca courts. The 
gacaca courts are part of the transitional Rwandan justice system charged with judging suspects 
in the 1994 genocide.
17 Their records contain information on the number of accused genocide 
perpetrators (those who organized the killings, those who  killed and those who looted) and 
genocide survivors (widows, orphans and disabled) at the sector level. The variables were 
aggregated at the commune level using the matching method described below. Then they were 
normalized using population counts from the 1991 census.
18  
Summary statistics on key variables included in the analysis are presented in Table 1 and 
Table 2. The proportion of survivors and perpetrators, genocide intensity, sex ratio, population 
density and literacy are measured at the commune level. All other variables are measured at the 
individual and household level. On average, 11.1% of the commune population was accused of 
participating in the genocide, and about 2% was classified as genocide survivors. Following 
Verpoorten (2011), I created an index that aggregated the six variables from the gacaca records 
using the first component of the principal component analysis. I standardize the index to mean 
zero and standard deviation one. As expected, the index of genocide intensity is strongly 
correlated with the variables from the gacaca records. The correlation is higher than .87 for 
widows, orphans and perpetrators suspected of organizing the killings or killing, and it is higher 
than .72 for disabled survivors and perpetrators suspected of looting.  
                                                 
17 A detailed assessment of the measures obtained from the gacaca records can be found in Verpoorten 
(2011). 
18 It is important to note that the measure of genocide intensity used in this paper is not a measure of the 
death toll. Variation in the genocide index comes from variation in the intensity of participation in 
genocide and variation in the number of survivors that are still alive in the commune. 10 
Figure 1 shows geographic variation in the index of genocide intensity. The genocide was 
more intense in the Southern and Western regions of the country. Genocide intensity is highly 
correlated with  the  pre-genocide proportion of Tutsi population (Verpoorten 2011) and  the 
distance from the border with Uganda (Akresh and de Walque 2008; Serneels and Verpoorten 
2013). For the latter reason, Southern and Western regions were more heavily affected. 
3.1.2.  Data on Marriage Market Sex Ratios 
I use data from the 1991 and 2002 censuses to create measures of  marriage market 
conditions. As highlighted by Neelakantan and Tertilt (2008), the marriage sex ratio tends to be 
lower than the sex ratio at birth and the population sex ratio. This happens for two reasons: first, 
the fact that men marry younger women together with population growth leads to an excess 
supply of women in the marriage market; and second, higher mortality rates for men also lower 
marriage market sex ratios. The genocide increased mortality rates of men relative to women and 
thus decreased the marriage market sex ratio.
19 I construct a measure of the sex ratio that takes 
into account that the average age gap between husband and wife is 5 years, with men being 
older.
20 I define the sex ratio in a commune as the number of men aged 20 to 54 living in the 
commune divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49 living in the commune.
21 Unlike 
previous studies  that  always included incarcerated individuals in the sex ratio, in some 
specifications I excluded incarcerated individuals from the population count.
22  
                                                 
19  Additionally, high incarceration rates and emigration of genocide perpetrators also contributed to 
decreasing the sex ratio in the short term. Unlike higher mortality rates for men, the effect of incarceration 
and emigration on the sex ratio might be temporary—inmates might eventually be released and exiled 
individuals might return to Rwanda. Nonetheless, as noted in section 2 of the paper, the prison population 
was still high in 2002. 
20 The average age gap between husband and wife is 5.8 for women who married before the genocide and 
5.2 for women who married after. 
21 A similar measure of the sex ratio was used by Abramitzky et al. (2011). 
22 The 1991 and 2002 census data downloadable from IPUMS allows me to identify individuals living in 
prison. Unfortunately, the disaggregated version of the 2002 census that I use in this paper does not 
identify individuals in prison. Information on prisons’  locations was collected on the website 
http://www.rcs.gov.rw/prisons.html (last access on 10/3/2013). I matched sector-level 2002 census data 
with government data on prisons’ locations and I dropped the sectors in which a prison was located when 
computing the sex ratio. 2002 census data indicate that the sectors in which a prison was located had 
much higher average age, sex ratio and migration rate compared to all other sectors within the same 
commune. The district-level sex ratio obtained using this method is very similar to the district-level sex 
ratio obtained by dropping individuals in prison from the IPUMS version of the 2002 Census. These 
results are available upon request. 11 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the distribution of the sex ratio across cohorts in 1991 and 2002. 
The sex ratio already seems quite low in 1991. High population growth and emigration 
(Verpoorten  2005) are potential explanations for this evidence.
23  The sex ratio decreased 
significantly in 2002, and  by  excluding  incarcerated individuals  I  significantly decrease the 
number of outliers (Figure 4). How are genocide intensity and changes in the sex ratio related? 
The correlation between genocide intensity and the absolute change in the sex ratio between 
1991 and 2002 measured at the commune level is 0.08. The correlation is significantly larger 
when I exclude incarcerated individuals from the sex ratio (0.38).  
3.1.3.  Data on Intimate Partner Violence 
The primary source of microeconomic data on  intimate partner violence and household 
characteristics is the 2005 DHS. Information on domestic violence was collected through a 
domestic violence module. Approximately 4,000 households were selected and all eligible 
women in the household (women aged 15-49) were interviewed for the core questionnaire, but 
only one woman in each selected household was randomly selected to be interviewed in the 
domestic violence module.
24 Among the selected women, never married and widowed women 
did not respond to the questions on intimate partner violence.
25 In addition, approximately 150 
separated women did not respond to the survey, leaving 2,544 observations. Lastly, I excluded 
from the main analysis 399 women who were married more than once, for whom information on 
the date of the current union could not be recovered with certainty. Ultimately, the primary 
sample included roughly 2,000 women.  
The main outcome of interest is a binary variable that takes value 1 if a woman suffered any 
aggressive behavior by her current partner in the 12 months before the survey. Violent behavior 
includes pushing, shaking, throwing something, slapping, twisting an arm, striking with a 
harmful object, kicking or dragging, attempting to strangle or burn, threatening with a weapon 
and attacking with a weapon. Other outcomes of interest include whether the woman was ever a 
victim of physical violence by a current or former partner, any sexual violence committed by the 
                                                 
23 Given that men marry younger women, systematic growth in cohort sizes implies that each cohort of 
men is matched with a larger cohort of women, giving rise to a marriage squeeze on women, i.e., their 
excess supply (Bhaskar 2012). 
24 This was done to assure privacy and safety for the respondents. 
25 There were 1,195 never-married women and 157 widowed women in the sample. 12 
current partner in the last six months, violence committed by individuals other than her partner, 
measures of decision-making power and attitudes toward domestic violence.  
Decision-making power is measured by the sum of situations in which the woman has the 
final say out  of five hypothetical situations:  the woman’s own health care, making large 
household purchases, making household purchases for daily needs, visits to family or relatives, 
and the food to be cooked each day. Attitudes toward intimate partner violence are measured by 
the number of situations in which the woman agrees that husbands are justified in beating their 
wives out of five possible situations. The situations include: when she goes out without telling 
him, neglects the children, argues with him, refuses to have sex with him, or burns the food.
26  
3.2.  Data Matching 
This paper combines data from the records of the gacaca courts with the 2005 Demographic 
and Health Survey (DHS) and the 1991 and 2002 Rwandan Census. Because the administrative 
boundaries changed over time, using these data sets together required matching between 
administrative units. To be more specific, the boundaries of Rwandan communes and prefectures 
changed  3  times  between 1991 (when the pre-genocide census was administered) and 2006 
(when  the  Organic Law that established the competencies of the gacaca  courts in trying 
suspected genocide perpetrators was passed.)
27  
In contrast, the names and boundaries of sectors were roughly maintained between 1991 and 
2006, which allows me to match the various data sets uniquely.  The 1991 Census data are 
available at the sector and commune level, data from the 2002 Census and the gacaca records are 
available at the sector and 2006 district level, and the 2005 DHS is geocoded.
28 I harmonized the 
various data sets by using the pre-genocide administrative level of the commune as a unit of 
                                                 
26 All women interviewed in the core questionnaire, including never-married, widowed and remarried 
women, were given the opportunity to answer questions on decision-making power and attitudes toward 
domestic violence. Therefore the sample size is larger compared to that used in the variables on intimate 
partner violence. 
27  More precisely, until 2002 the country was divided into 1,484 sectors, 145 communes and 11 
prefectures. In 2002, an administrative reform replaced the communes with 104 districts, and the 
prefectures were transformed into 12 provinces. Finally, the boundaries changed again in 2006, when the 
country was split into 30 districts and 5 regions. 
28 The 2002 census data from IPUMS is available at the 2002 district level. Marijke Verpoorten shared 
population counts from a restricted version of the 2002 census that is available at the sector level. I use 
her restricted data set to compute the 2002 sex ratio at the commune level. 13 
analysis.
29 To do so, I aggregated the gacaca data and the 2002 Census at the commune level and 
assigned DHS clusters to the communes in ArcGIS.  
The crucial step was creating a link between the sectors in the gacaca data, the sectors in the 
2002 Census and the communes. In their work, Friedman (2011) and Yanagizawa-Drott (2012) 
had merged the gacaca data with the 1991 Census using sector names as key. Still, this method 
could lead to measurement error because many sector names were duplicates and a few sectors 
changed names during this period.  
In this project, I combined a merge obtained in ArcGIS with a merge based on localities’ 
names. Sectors, communes and 2006 districts were first linked in ArcGIS using their geospatial 
coordinates. The link obtained in ArcGIS was then merged with the gacaca data using sector 
names as well as 2006 district names as key.
30 The match was a major improvement with respect 
to the previous matches for two reasons. First, linking sectors to communes based on their 
geographic coordinates reduced measurement error created by duplicate sectors. Second, error 
was further reduced by merging based on sector names and district names rather than sector 
names only.
31  
4. Empirical Strategy 
This section explains the empirical strategy used to identify the effect of the genocide on 
intimate partner violence through changes in the marriage market. Subsection 4.1 presents the 
difference-in-differences strategy. Subsection 4.2 discusses threats to validity. 
4.1.  Difference-in-differences Analysis 
The primary objective of this paper is to study how civil conflict affects spousal violence 
through changes in local marriage market conditions. The main identification strategy used to 
estimate this relationship is similar to difference-in-differences. It  exploits  cross-sectional 
geographic variation in genocide intensity across communes and temporal variation in marriage 
timing across marriage cohorts. In other words, the empirical strategy combines a difference-in-
differences strategy with a continuous treatment variable.  
                                                 
29 In 1991, 51,235 persons lived in a commune on average and the mean size of superficies was 153.8 
square meters. 
30 As a robustness check, I also merged the data obtained from this merge with the 1991 census data using 
sector names as well as commune names as key.  
31 In a few cases, mostly when sectors had changed names, I matched the sectors with the communes 
manually. For the data on genocide perpetrators, I followed the method used by Friedman (2011), who 
kindly shared her code with me. For the data on genocide suspects, I matched the data manually.  14 
I estimate the following regression equation:  
𝑌 𝑖𝑐𝑘 = 𝗽0 + 𝗽1𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑐 ∙ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑘 + 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑘𝗿 + 𝑋𝑐𝑘𝜎 + 𝜃𝑐 + 𝗾𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑘                         (1) 
In this specification, 𝑌 𝑖𝑐𝑘 indicates whether woman i in commune c belonging to marriage 
cohort k (i.e. became married in year k) was a victim of physical violence by her partner in the 
last 12 months. Genocidec is a measure of genocide intensity in commune c. Married afterk is a 
binary indicator that takes value 1 if the woman became married after the genocide and zero 
otherwise.  Xick  is a vector of variables that contains measurements of the woman’s and her 
husband’s characteristics,  such as religion, the woman’s age and her age at first marriage, 
woman’s and partner’s educational attainment, urban status and an asset index. 𝑋𝑐𝑘 is a vector of 
time-varying commune-level characteristics obtained from the 1991 and 2002 censuses, such as 
the literacy rate and population density. I assign women a value from the 1991 Census if they 
married before the genocide and a value from the 2002 Census if they married after the genocide. 
𝜃𝑐  is a commune–specific fixed effect that accounts for unobserved persistent heterogeneity 
across communes.  𝗾𝑘  represents a year of marriage fixed effect.  It  controls for unobserved 
shocks that are common to women in the same marriage cohort. I estimate equation (1) using a 
linear probability model (OLS) and I cluster the standard errors at the commune level to account 
for within-commune serial correlation (Duflo et al. 2004).
32 All regressions are weighted using 
survey weights. 
The coefficient of interest is 𝗽1, which represents the difference-in-differences estimator. 
Because  the measure of genocide intensity is standardized to have mean zero and standard 
deviation one, 𝗽1 indicates the effect of a one standard deviation increase in genocide intensity 
on the probability that a woman who married after the genocide becomes a victim of spousal 
violence relative to a woman who married before. The effect is measured with respect to the 
mean value of genocide intensity, which is equal to zero. 
4.2.  Threats to Validity 
4.2.1.  Parallel Trends 
The key identifying assumption is that, in the absence of the genocide, trends for intimate 
partner violence would have been similar in high and low genocide-intensity communes. It is 
                                                 
32 I choose to report the results of the linear probability model because the interpretation of the coefficient 
estimate on the interaction term is straightforward. Nevertheless, the results are similar when I estimate 
equation (1) with a Probit model. The results are available upon request.  15 
virtually impossible to test for this assumption directly because in reality I cannot observe the 
counterfactual. In other words, I cannot examine how spousal violence would have evolved in 
high genocide-intensity localities had the genocide not occurred.  A solution that has been 
frequently adopted in the literature is to test for parallel trends before the event of interest 
occurred (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). In the context of this paper, this would translate into 
comparing trends in high and low genocide intensity over some period before the genocide 
occurred. Unfortunately, the lack of a baseline survey precludes me from running such test in the 
analysis. Nevertheless, I can exploit information contained in the data to run a similar test.  
Women are asked whether their mother was a victim of spousal violence. Because women 
normally give birth during their 20s, this is roughly equivalent to observing intimate partner 
violence for women born about 20 years before the women in the sample.
33 I can thus test the 
parallel trends hypothesis by comparing rates of spousal violence for the mothers of women who 
married after the genocide with rates of spousal violence for the mothers of women who married 
before the conflict.
34 To do so, I estimate equation (1) using domestic violence between the 
woman’s parents as a dependent variable. If there were preexisting differential trends in high 
genocide localities, I would expect the coefficient on the interaction term to be statistically 
significant. Column 1 of Table 3 presents the results of the falsification test. The estimated 
coefficient on the interaction term is small and not statistically different from zero. Thus, the 
result of the placebo test provides no supporting evidence for the hypothesis of pre-existing 
differential trends for intimate partner violence in high-genocide localities.     
Besides the aforementioned falsification test, I control for differential trends in three 
additional ways. First, in some specifications I include time-varying commune level controls, 
such as population density and literacy rate. These variables control for changes in economic and 
social conditions that happened after the genocide at the commune level.  Second,  in some 
specifications I control for a linear time trend at the province level (𝗾𝑃 ∙ 𝑘). Province-specific 
time trends allow communes in provinces that were differentially affected by the genocide to 
have different trends. Third,  in some specifications I include an interaction term between 
province fixed effects and an indicator for becoming married  after the genocide (𝗾𝑃 ⋅
                                                 
33 Before the genocide, the average age at first birth was 21 (1992 DHS).  
34 Calderón et al. (2011) and Chin (2013) use the same variable to construct a falsification test. Their 
identification strategies are quite different from the one used here because they use instrumental variables. 16 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑘). This permits me to estimate the effect of the genocide on intimate partner 
violence using only within-province variation in genocide intensity and holding constant all 
unobservable time-varying factors at the province level. 
4.2.2.  Endogeneity of Marriage Timing 
There might be a concern that marriage timing is  correlated with unobservable 
characteristics that affect both genocide intensity and intimate partner violence. To account for 
the potential endogeneity of marriage timing, I exploit the fact that the cohort of birth is a strong 
predictor for the cohort of marriage. I estimate a reduced form model that exploits temporal 
variation in year of birth instead of temporal variation in marriage timing. To be more specific, I 
replace 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑘 in equation (1) with a binary variable that takes value 1 if the woman 
was born after 1973 and zero otherwise (“Younger than 21 in 1994”). This variable is a proxy for 
entering marriageable age after the genocide.
35  I also estimate a Two-Stage Least-Squares 
(2SLS)  model  using  “Younger than 21  in 1994”  as an instrumental variable for 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑘.
36  The first stage F statistic for the interaction  term 
(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑐 ∙ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑘) is well above the critical value, suggesting that the instruments 
are not weak (Table 4).  
4.2.3.  Selection into Marriage 
Because getting married is a choice and women self-select into relationships, there could be 
a concern that women with a lower propensity to tolerate domestic violence dropped out of the 
marriage market  after the genocide.
37  If this behavior were more frequent in localities with 
higher genocide intensity, then negative selection into marriage would bias the results upward.
38 
Concerns about selection may not be well founded in this setting, where getting married is the 
“default” choice for the majority of women. As documented by the literature, Rwandan culture 
places a high value on marriage and children; women’s role in society is that of wives and 
mothers (Human Rights Watch 1996). For instance, 1992 Demographic and Health Survey data 
                                                 
35 Before the genocide, the average age of marriage was 19. 
36 The results of the first-stage analysis are available upon request. 
37 This could happen if, for example, women anticipated experiencing more intimate partner violence as a 
result of the genocide. 
38 By negative selection, I mean that women with a higher propensity for intimate partner violence are 
more likely to get married than women with a lower propensity. Positive selection may also exist. 
However, positive selection is less worrisome because it would bias the results downward.   17 
indicate that only 2% of women aged 30 to 49 were never married, and 95% of married women 
were married by age 25. Nonetheless, because the genocide affected the sex ratio, I could expect 
fewer women to get married after the genocide because fewer men were available for marriage.
39  
Given these concerns, I test for selection into marriage in two different ways. First,  I 
examine whether genocide intensity is correlated with women’s background characteristics that 
are determined outside of marriage, such as years of education and height.
40 To do so, I estimate 
equation (1) using years of education and height as dependent variables. Second, I estimate a 
two-step Heckman (1979) selection model for the reduced form regression, which I described in 
subsection 4.2.2. I use the number of younger sisters of the woman as an instrument for the 
selection equation. The number of younger sisters is strongly negatively correlated with  a 
woman’s age at first marriage throughout the developing world (Vogl 2013), but it should not 
affect intimate partner violence (besides its effect on age at marriage and marital outcomes). The 
results of the Heckman selection model are described in section 5. 
Table 5 presents the results of the analysis of background characteristics for the whole DHS 
sample (columns 1 and 3) and for the domestic violence sample (columns 2 and 4). It is 
important to note that both the height and the years of education of the youngest women in the 
sample could be negatively affected by the genocide (Akresh and de Walque 2008; Aguero and 
Deolalikar 2012). In fact, the results reported in columns 1 and 2 indicate that women who 
married after the genocide in localities  with higher genocide intensity have more  years of 
education. The result is statistically significant and holds when I restrict the sample to women 
interviewed in the domestic violence questionnaire. On the other hand, columns 2 and 4 show 
that the correlation between genocide intensity and height is negative and not statistically 
significant. This result implies that married women in communes with high genocide intensity 
were positively selected after the genocide. This result has two other important implications. 
First, it suggests that negative selection into marriage is not driving the main result. Instead, the 
estimated effect of genocide on intimate partner violence could be biased downward if more 
educated women were less likely to be victims of intimate partner violence. Second, this result is 
                                                 
39 This statement would be correct if polygyny was not common in Rwanda. Polygyny exists in Rwanda 
in spite of being illegal. Although polygamy was formally banned in 1978, in 2002 10% of married 
women were in a polygamous union (2002 Census). 
40 This follows Chari et al. (2013). 18 
consistent with a model of the marriage market where a decline in the demand for women pushes 
women with lower “quality” out of the marriage market.  
4.3.  Selective Migration 
Finally, non-random migration could pose a threat to the validity of the estimates. 
Specifically, selective migration could bias the results. The genocide generated two different 
types of migration: emigration of “new case” refugees out of Rwanda and immigration of “old 
case” refugees into Rwanda. Regarding emigration, the genocide resulted in massive population 
displacements. Specifically, about two million individuals were displaced in refugee camps at the 
borders  of  neighboring countries. Selective emigration could bias the results upward if, for 
example, women with a lower tolerance for intimate partner violence migrated out of localities 
with high genocide intensity after the genocide; this would imply a “negative” selection for those 
who stayed in high-genocide localities. If this were the case, the estimate of β1 would be biased 
upward.  Nonetheless, the vast majority of refugees  had  returned  home by December 1996 
(Gourevitch 1998). Therefore, they would not be considered migrants in the 2005 DHS. This 
suggests that selective emigration is not a major concern in this setting.  
Regarding immigration into Rwanda, about one million “old case” refugees returned home 
from neighboring countries after the genocide. Many of the returnees were descendants of Tutsis 
who fled Rwanda during the 1950s and 1960s (Gourevitch 1998). This mass return migration 
was “a historically unprecedented, epic phenomenon” (Gourevitch  1998  p.  230).  Selective 
immigration could bias the results upward if, for example, women with a high tolerance for 
spousal violence were more likely to relocate into localities with high genocide intensity.  
Previous studies often dealt with selective migration by estimating the intent-to-treat rather 
than the average treatment effect. This is usually done by assigning individuals to treatment 
based on their place of birth rather than their place of residence (Angrist and Pischke 2008). 
Unfortunately, the Rwandan DHS contains no information on place of birth. However, the does 
DHS provide information on “how many years the respondent has lived in the current place of 
residence.” I define a household as “non-migrant” if the woman or her husband has lived in the 
current place of residence longer than 11 years (since before the genocide). Husband’s migration 
history is a good approximation for the woman’s migration history because the majority of 19 
women married someone from the same commune of birth.
41 I define a woman as “non-migrant” 
if the woman lived in her current place of residence for at least 11 years.
42 I estimate the results 
separately for non-migrant households and non-migrant women.  
5. Results  
This section describes the main results found in this paper, estimating the effect of the 
genocide on intimate partner violence through the marriage market.  
Table 3 shows the estimates of the impact of genocide intensity on intimate partner violence 
for women who married after the genocide relative to women who married before. Column 2 
shows that a one standard deviation increase in genocide intensity in the commune of residence 
raises the probability of intimate partner violence in the last 12 months by 5 percentage points. 
Put differently, women who live in a locality in the 75th percentile of genocide intensity are on 
average 7 percentage points more likely to have experienced intimate partner violence in the last 
12 months than women who live in a locality in the 25th percentile of genocide intensity. These 
effects are quite substantial: the estimated impact represents an increase of 37% with respect to 
the sample mean (0.19). Including commune fixed effects and year of marriage fixed effects does 
not affect the estimate (column 3).
43  
In column 4, the inclusion of time-varying commune-level controls increases the estimate by 
about 10%, suggesting that the presence of time-varying omitted characteristics at the commune 
level attenuates the effect of the genocide. Column 5 adds province-specific linear time trends, 
and column 6 adds province dummies interacted with an indicator for becoming married after the 
genocide. These controls hold constant any variable that could vary at the province level and 
                                                 
41 According to the census, in 1991 59% of married individuals in the census were married to someone 
from the same commune of birth. In 2002, 72% of married individuals in the sample married someone 
from the same district of birth. 
42  Using this definition leads to a migration rate higher than 50%, which is inconsistent with other 
sources. For instance, census data indicate that, in 2002, 24% of the population lived in a district that was 
not their district of birth. This definition of non-migrant households might not be accurate because the 
questionnaire does not precisely define the “current place of residence”. I find that over 25% of the 
women seemed to report the year in which they moved to the current place of residence in a manner 
suggesting the year in which they moved to the groom’s house after the wedding. 
43 Other variables affect domestic violence in a reasonable manner. Age at first marriage is negatively 
related to domestic violence, and the effect is statistically significant. Woman’s education is negatively 
correlated with domestic violence, although the effect is not significant. Women married to husbands with 
more than primary education (approximately 3% of the sample) are 7 percentage points less likely to be 
victims of domestic violence with respect to women whose husbands have no education. These results are 
not reported but they are available upon request.  20 
could affect women who married after the genocide differently from women who married before. 
Including these controls does not affect the results. This shows that the genocide increased 
intimate partner violence more in communes with high genocide intensity relative to communes 
with low genocide intensity within the same province. 
There could be a concern that the timing of marriage is itself endogenous. Column 1 of 
Table 4 presents the results of the reduced form model that uses age at the time of the genocide 
as explanatory variable,  instead of year of marriage. The results indicate that the genocide 
increased the probability of intimate partner violence for women who entered marriageable age 
after the genocide (as measured by being younger than 21 in 1994) relative to older women. The 
effect is slightly smaller compared to the estimate presented in Table 3; a one standard deviation 
increase in genocide intensity in the commune of residence increased the probability of being a 
victim of physical violence by 3.9 percentage points. Column 2 of Table 4 displays the results of 
the 2SLS model, where “Younger than 21 in 1994” is used as an instrumental variable for 
“Married after the genocide.” A one standard deviation increase in genocide intensity in the 
commune of residence increased the probability of intimate partner violence by 5.06 percentage 
points. In this case, the 2SLS estimate is almost identical to the OLS estimate presented in Table 
3. 
To address nonrandom selection into marriage in the aftermath of the genocide, I estimate a 
Heckman selection model. Table A1 in the Appendix displays the results of the Heckman 
selection model. The Heckman selection model is estimated for the reduced form regression (the 
results of the reduced form regression are presented in column 1 of Table 4). Column 1 of Table 
A1 shows the results of the selection equation. Only never-married women and women who are 
currently married or separated are included in the analysis (widowed women and women who 
married more than once are excluded). The number of younger sisters of a woman, a figure 
which is used as instrument in the selection equation, is strongly positively correlated with being 
married and being part of the sample. Column 2 presents the two-step estimate. The results are 
very close to the reduced form estimates. However, the hypothesis that the two parts of the 
selection model are independent cannot be rejected, suggesting that there is no selection into 
marriage. 
The results presented in Table 3 indicate that the genocide had a differential effect on 
intimate partner violence for women who married after the genocide relative to women who 21 
married before, and that the effect was greater in communes with higher genocide intensity. The 
estimated effect is large in magnitude and does not seem to be driven by pre-existing trends in 
localities with higher genocide intensity. In section A of the Appendix, I present numerous 
robustness checks for this finding. The results are found to be robust using alternative controls 
for age, restricting the sample to non-migrants and employing alternative specifications of the 
dependent variable. Additionally, I test for misreporting in three different ways and find no 
evidence of misreporting. The results reported in Table 3 could be interpreted in a causal fashion 
if they were generated by mechanisms that would affect women who married after the genocide 
but not women who married before. In the next section, I discuss the potential mechanisms 
behind the main results. 
6. Potential Mechanisms  
This section discusses potential mechanisms for the effect of genocide on intimate partner 
violence for women who became married after the genocide relative to women who became 
married before. Subsection 6.1 presents and provides evidence for the preferred mechanism: 
changes in the marriage market that affected the relative well-being of men and women within a 
marriage. Subsection 6.2 discusses and tests alternative mechanisms.  
6.1.  Marriage Market Sex Ratio 
The preferred channel for the main result is related to the sharp decline in adult sex ratios 
following the genocide. Economists have long been interested in the sex ratio as a potential 
determinant of marriage outcomes. According to Becker’s theories of marriage (Becker 1973 and 
1981), the relative well-being of wives and husbands within their marriage depends on factors 
influencing the marriage market, including the sex ratio. When the sex ratio is low, men benefit 
from marriage and obtain a larger share of marital output. Becker proposed consumption 
expenditures benefiting husbands and wives and leisure time enjoyed by husbands and wives as 
possible indicators of relative well-being (Becker 1973; Grossbard-Shechtman 1995). Intimate 
partner violence could also be an indicator of the relative well-being of husbands and wives 
within the marriage. A lower sex ratio could thus increase intimate partner violence.  
In this paper, I examine how the sex ratio at the time of marriage may affect intimate partner 
violence. I assign a woman the sex ratio from 1991 or 2002 based on the estimated probability 
that she became married after the genocide as predicted by her characteristics. To do so, I 
estimate a probit regression for marrying after the genocide, including controls for religion, year 22 
of birth, number of siblings and place of residence during childhood.
44 The results of the probit 
regression are reported in Table A3 in the Appendix. For each woman, I predict the probability 
that she married after the genocide (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏_𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 � ) and then define the sex ratio as: 
𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑐 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏_𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 � × 𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑐2002 + (1-𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏_𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 � ) × 𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑐1991                 (2) 
c is the commune of residence of the woman. 𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑐1991 is the sex ratio in commune c 
from 1991 census data and 𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑐2002  is the sex ratio in commune c from 2002 census data. I 
then estimate the following regression model: 
𝑌 𝑖𝑐𝑘 = 𝗽0 + 𝗽1𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑐 + 𝑋𝑖𝗿 + 𝑋𝑐𝑘𝜎 + 𝜃𝑐 + 𝗾𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑘                                 (3) 
Where Sexratioc is the measure of the sex ratio described in equation (2), λk are year of 
marriage fixed effects and  θc  are  commune fixed effects.  I obtained similar results when I 
assigned the sex ratio from the 1991 Census to women who became married before the genocide 
and the sex ratio from the 2002 Census to women who became married.
45  
Table 6 displays the estimates for the regression model described in equation (3) when 
physical violence by partner in the last 12 months is used as dependent variable. The marriage 
market sex ratio has a negative effect on the probability of intimate partner violence (columns 1 
and 2), and the effect is large and statistically significant when incarcerated individuals are not 
included in the numerator (column 2). The estimated effect is quite sizeable: a one standard 
deviation decrease in the sex ratio increases the probability of being a victim of intimate partner 
violence by 12.5 percentage points (column 2). The sign of the coefficient estimate on the sex 
ratio is consistent with the theoretical argument described in subsection 6.1—when the sex ratio 
is low, the relative well-being of women within marriage decreases. 
To disentangle the relative contribution of genocide intensity and the sex ratio, I also include 
the interaction term between genocide intensity and marrying after the genocide (𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑐 ∙
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑘) in equation (3). The results are shows in columns 3 and 4 of Table 6. When 
both sex ratio and genocide intensity are included in the regression, the estimated coefficient on 
the sex ratio remains significant but the estimated coefficient on the interaction term decreases 
by 38% (column 4). This suggests that at least one-third of the effect of the genocide on domestic 
                                                 
44 Place of residence during childhood is measured using binary indicators for whether she grew up in the 
countryside, in a town or in the capital. 
45 This follows Abramitzky et al. (2011). These results are reported in Table A4 the Appendix. 23 
violence happened through the sex ratio. The results presented in Table 6 are robust to alternative 
definitions of the sex ratio (Table A4). 
If the genocide affected intimate partner violence through changes in the marriage market, I 
would expect other measures of intra-household allocation to be affected as well. Therefore, I 
examine the effect of genocide intensity and changes in the sex ratio on women’s decision-
making power within the household. Table  7  displays the results for the regression model 
described in equation (3) using as the dependent variable indicators for whether the woman has 
no say in five different situations.
46 The results show that women who married after the genocide 
in localities where the genocide was more intense have lower decision-making power within the 
household, even in decisions on how to spend family resources (Panel A). Specifically, a one 
standard deviation increase in genocide intensity is associated with a 3.6%  increase  in the 
probability that the woman has no say on large purchases, which represents an 8% increase with 
respect to the sample mean (Panel A). A lower sex ratio is associated with lower decision-
making power within the household for women who married after the genocide. However, the 
coefficient estimate on the sex ratio is not always statistically significant (Panel B and Panel C). 
The results presented in Table 7 support the hypothesis that changes in the marriage market 
were a plausible mechanism through which the genocide affected intimate partner violence and 
intra-household allocation. The results complement findings that lower sex ratios in Rwanda 
increased marriage rates for men and decreased marriage rates for women after the genocide 
(Schindler and Verpoorten 2013).
47 The results are consistent with previous findings that higher 
sex ratios in China and Taiwan increased women’s decision-making power within the household 
(Edlund et al. 2013) and increased human capital investments in children (Francis 2011; Porter 
2007). The genocide might have long-lasting harmful implications for human capital investments 
in children through the negative effect on women’s decision-making power.  
6.2.  Alternative Mechanisms 
Section 5 provides evidence that higher genocide intensity in the commune of residence is 
associated with higher risk of intimate partner violence for women who married after the end of 
                                                 
46 The sample size is larger with respect to the analysis of the effect of genocide on domestic violence 
because I do not have to restrict the analysis to women who responded to the domestic violence module. 
47 In an earlier paper, Schindler (2010) showed that lower sex ratios at the province and cohort level were 
associated with higher work within the household for young unmarried women, but not for married 
women.  24 
the conflict relative to women who married before. The results described in Section 6.1 show 
that part of this effect can be explained by low marriage market sex ratios. Moreover, higher 
genocide intensity and, marginally, lower sex ratios are associated with lower decision-making 
power for women. These results are consistent with sex ratios at the time of marriage affecting 
the well-being of women within the marriage. Nonetheless, the estimated relationship between 
genocide intensity and intimate partner violence may be driven by various mechanisms, only one 
of which is captured by the sex ratio. Here I discuss such mechanisms. Some channels are related 
to the marriage market, such as changes in the quality of available grooms due to selective 
killings and a decrease in the opportunity cost of marriage. Other channels are not related to the 
marriage market and include psychological trauma and social disorder created by the genocide.  
6.2.1.  Alternative Mechanisms Related to the Marriage Market 
Alternative channels related to the marriage market include non-random mortality during the 
genocide and a decrease in the opportunity cost of marriage. Non-random mortality might have 
affected the quality of men available for marriage. Selection in  victimization might have 
occurred along both observable and unobservable characteristics that could be correlated with 
intimate partner violence. For example, de Walque and Verwimp (2010) find that men with an 
educated background were more likely to be killed during the genocide.  
I examine whether women who married after the genocide in communes with high genocide 
intensity were more likely to marry men with certain observable characteristics relative to 
women who married before the genocide and women who live in localities with low genocide 
intensity. The results are reported in Table 8. In columns 1 through 4, the coefficient on the 
interaction term between genocide intensity and marrying after the genocide is negative, 
indicating that higher genocide intensity is associated with “lower quality” husbands in terms of 
observable characteristics. However, the coefficient is small in magnitude and not statistically 
significant. Overall, the data provide no evidence that husbands differed in their educational 
attainment, occupation, age or attitude towards domestic violence. These results do not support 
the hypothesis that selection in the killings based on observable characteristics is behind the main 
results in this paper. Nonetheless, it is plausible that selection based on unobservable 
characteristics explains part of the differential effect of genocide on domestic violence for 
women who married after the conflict.  25 
The genocide may have affected the value that women attach to being married. The idea 
behind this argument is quite simple, and is also drawn from Becker’s (1973, 1981) seminal 
theories of marriage. Individuals compare their output when single to their output when married, 
and they will only marry if their expected output from being married is larger than their expected 
output from being single (the opportunity cost of marriage).
 The genocide may have decreased 
the opportunity cost of marriage in several ways. For instance, sexual violence was widespread 
during the genocide: an estimated 250,000 women were raped and some women were held 
captive by militias or forced into marriage. As a result, women might demand more physical 
protection.  
Similarly, women whose parents or siblings died might be in need of economic support in 
the aftermath of the war. Poverty was exacerbated by customary rules preventing women from 
owning land, which could also contribute to the  decreased  opportunity cost of marriage. 
Therefore, after the genocide, women might enter marriages with a lower expected output than 
they would have before the genocide, leading to a decrease in the well-being of women within 
the household. While I don’t provide direct evidence for this mechanism in this paper, reports 
from various sources are consistent with this channel. For example, the Human Rights Watch 
report “Shattered Lives” (1996) provides anecdotal evidence that women’s opportunity cost of 
marriage decreased after the genocide:  
“In Rwandan society, where women are valued primarily for their role as wives and 
mothers, the issue of marriageability is extremely important. Further, for many women, 
marriage is their best option to obtain economic security and some protection. `It's always 
sad to see a girl who survived [the genocide],’ said Jeanne, herself a rape survivor. `They 
have no future. Some marry without really wanting to, because they are all alone. They can't 
farm their parents' land—they need a husband to help work the fields.’” (p. 43) 
6.2.2.  Alternative Mechanisms Outside of the Marriage Market 
Alternative  channels  that  are not related to the marriage market include social disorder 
created by the genocide and psychological trauma due to participation or victimization during the 
killings.  
The genocide might have increased men’s propensity to perpetrate intimate partner violence 
against their partners through a decrease in the expected penalties for crime and violence due to a 
lack of security and social order (World Bank 2011). On the other hand, the genocide could have 26 
spurred a trauma-related increase in violent behavior. A few studies in economics have examined 
how exposure to conflict and combat affects violent behavior. Rohlfs (2010) exploits variation in 
exposure to the Vietnam War across cohorts to show that combat exposure increased self-
reported criminal and violent behavior among African American men. Miguel et al. (2011) find 
that the extent of civil conflict in a soccer player’s country of origin is associated with more 
violent behavior on the soccer field, as measured by yellow and red cards. Cesur and Sabia 
(2013) estimate that exposure to combat increases domestic violence, and that part of the effect 
can be explained by increased stress. Outside economics literature, the evidence is mixed. Gupta 
et al. (2010) find a positive correlation between married men’s experience of human rights 
violations during the apartheid in South Africa and the perpetration of physical violence against 
their female partners. On the contrary, Annan et al. (2011) find no relationship between child 
abduction and aggressive behavior among former abductees in Northern Uganda.  
The lack of a baseline survey prevents me from estimating the impact of these channels on 
intimate partner violence for women across the board. Given the limitations imposed by the data, 
I examine whether these channels could explain the main results of this paper (the differential 
effect of genocide on women who married after the genocide relative to women who married 
before). In principle, I expect these mechanisms to increase the propensity to commit intimate 
partner violence in the same way for men who married after the genocide and for men who 
married before. As such, these mechanisms cannot explain the results of the difference-in-
differences estimation. In fact, the cross-sectional relationship between genocide intensity and 
intimate partner violence for women who married before the genocide is negative (albeit not 
statistically significant).
48  Furthermore,  I  use a retrospective panel to examine  whether the 
genocide increased the probability of spousal violence in marriages that formed before the outset 
of conflict. The retrospective panel analysis, which is described in the Appendix, provides no 
evidence that the genocide increased the risk of spousal violence among surviving marriages that 
formed before the outset of the conflict (Appendix, section B).  
Neither the cross-sectional analysis nor the retrospective panel analysis is immune from 
criticism. The cross-sectional analysis could suffer from omitted variable bias. The retrospective 
panel analysis assumes that women correctly recall the year in which the first episode of spousal 
                                                 
48 These results are available upon request. 27 
violence occurred. In fact, some memory bias could occur (Gibson and Kim 2005) and it would 
be a concern if that bias varied with genocide intensity.  For these reasons, I provide two 
additional tests for the conjecture that the genocide increased intimate partner violence through 
social disorder or psychological trauma.  
If a breakdown of social justice and moral conduct were behind the results of the difference-
in-differences analysis, I would expect to observe an effect on other types of violent behavior 
besides intimate partner violence. To test this hypothesis, I estimate equation (4) using violence 
perpetrated by other family members (columns 1 and 2) and by individuals outside the family 
(column 3) as the dependent variable. The results are reported in Table 9. The point estimate for 
the effect of genocide on violence committed by other family members, in-laws and individuals 
outside the family is small, negative and not statistically significant. The results are similar when 
I consider violence committed by any individual other than one’s  partner  as the dependent 
variable (column 4). In sum, the results shown in Table 9 do not support the hypothesis that an 
increase in violent behavior in Rwandan society as a whole is behind the main results of the 
paper.   
As noted above, I would expect all men in this period to be vulnerable to trauma and suffer 
from post-traumatic stress disorder. Nonetheless, there could be a concern that younger men 
were more vulnerable to trauma because they were more likely to be victimized or involved in 
the killings. If this was the case, a trauma-driven increase in men’s propensity to perpetrate 
domestic violence might explain the difference-in-differences results;  women who became 
married after the genocide married younger men, as compared to women who married before the 
outbreak of the conflict.
49 In column 5 of Table 9, I test whether the effect of the genocide on 
domestic violence is heterogeneous across husband’s age.  If anything, the results show that 
conditional on marrying after the genocide, women who married older men are more likely to be 
victims of intimate partner violence. Consequently, these results do not support the hypothesis 
                                                 
49 In fact, the evidence on the age profile of genocide perpetrators does not support the hypothesis that 
young men were more likely to participate in the genocide compared to middle-aged men. Verwimp 
(2005) studies the characteristics of genocide perpetrators using a representative sample and finds that 
participation in the genocide increased with age and peaked around age 38. Straus (2006) interviews 
imprisoned genocide perpetrators and compares their characteristics to the population averages from the 
1991 Census. He finds that the majority of perpetrators were aged 30 to 39. 28 
that an increase in violent behavior in the society as a whole is behind the main results of the 
paper.    
7. Conclusion 
This paper examines the long-term effects of civil conflict on intimate partner violence using 
data from post-genocide Rwanda. I combine recently released data on genocide perpetrators and 
genocide survivors with a household survey and census data. I document that the genocide 
increased intimate partner violence for women who became married after the genocide relative to 
women who became married before, and the effect is greater for women who live in localities 
with high genocide intensity. These results shed light on the legacies of the genocide on 
women’s well-being. After the genocide, the Rwandan government implemented various reforms 
aimed at improving women’s property rights and increasing their political representation. 
However, I show that the genocide had long-lived negative effects on women’s well-being, and 
these effects were still sizeable 11 years after the end of the killings. 
In investigating potential mechanisms for this finding, I show that about one-third of the 
increase in intimate partner violence can be attributed to the sharp decline in the sex ratio 
following the genocide. Recent research on the consequences of gender imbalances on intra-
household allocation has focused on countries that face a shortage of women, such as China and 
India (Porter 2007; Francis 2011; Edlund et al. 2013). While the genocide was specific to 
Rwanda, these results could  provide insights on the determinants of women’s well-being in 
countries that experience a similar shortage of men—for example, regions with low sex ratio due 
to high emigration of working age males.
50 
I show that the increase in intimate partner violence is not driven by psychological trauma or 
social disorders. Rather, at least part the effect seems to operate through marriage market 
conditions at the time of marriage, as measured by the sex ratio. Additionally, a stigma against 
female genocide survivors, the need for physical protection and increased economic insecurity 
could have led to a decrease in the opportunity cost of marriage for women. This mechanism 
might account for the differential increased in intimate partner violence that is not explained by 
changes in the sex ratio. The overall findings in this paper suggest that policies that aim to 
                                                 
50 In Mexico, where there are large gender differences in the probability to emigrate, the sex ratio for the 
age group including working age males decreased from 96 in 1970 to 89 in 2000 (Chiapa and Vlejo 
2012). 29 
increase autonomy, protection and decision-making power of women  in  recently married 
households may help to reduce intimate partner violence in post-conflict societies with low sex 
ratio. On the other hand, programs that provide counselling for men and programs that facilitate 
the reintegration of those who were involved in the killings may be less effective in reducing 
spousal violence in similar settings. 
There are a number of caveats to the results presented in this paper. The results are based on 
a sample of women who survived the genocide and did not leave the country after the conflict; 
this sample includes women who became married after the genocide and women who became 
married before the genocide and whose marriage was still intact 11 years after the genocide. The 
implications of this study may not extend to women who migrated abroad and to women who 
became widows or remarried after the end of the conflict. Finally, these results provide evidence 
of an increase in intimate partner violence for women who married after the genocide relative to 
women who married before. It would have been useful to have pre-genocide data on intimate 
partner violence to estimate the impact of civil conflict on the whole population of women. Still, 
I think that this study is an important contribution looking at the long-run effects of civil 
conflicts through changes in marriage market conditions.   
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Tables 
Table 1 Summary Statistics     
Variable  Mean  Standard  
deviation 
Suspected perpetrators (organized the killings)
†  0.010  0.008 
Suspected perpetrators (killed)
†  0.058  0.038 
Suspected perpetrators (looted)
†  0.043  0.030 
Survivors: widows and widowers
†  0.004  0.004 
Survivors: orphans
†  0.011  0.009 
Survivors: disabled
†  0.002  0.002 
Genocide index (standardized)
†  -0.003  1.010 
Literacy rate, 1991
‡  0.511  0.072 
Population density, 1991
‡  447.176  389.584 
Literacy rate, 2002
‡  0.561  0.073 
Population density, 2002
‡  506.812  841.010 
Sex ratio (Men age 20-54 : Women age 15-49), 1991
‡  0.769  0.082 
Sex ratio (Men age 20-54 : Women age 15-49), 2002
‡  0.620  0.099 
Observations*  140    
Notes: 
† Source: records of the gacaca courts. 
‡ Source: 1991 and 2002 Census of Rwandan  
population. *Before 2002 Rwanda was divided in 145 communes, but the 2005 DHS was  
conducted in 140 communes. 
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Table 2 Summary Statistics       
Variable   Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Number of 
observations 
Variables from the DHS Domestic Violence Module       
Parent Violence (yes=1,no=0)  0.325  0.469  2302 
Physical violence in last 12 months (yes=1,no=0)  0.182  0.386  2037 
Sexual violence in last 12 months (yes=1,no=0)  0.095  0.293  2082 
Ever physical violence (yes=1,no=0)  0.341  0.474  2130 
Seeking help (yes=1,no=0)  0.457  0.498  781 
Seeking help from other than family (yes=1,no=0)  0.356  0.479  781 
Seeking help from people other than family  
conditional on seeking help (yes=1,no=0) 
0.780  0.415  342 
Ever hurt by family member(yes=1,no=0)  0.022  0.148  2391 
Ever hurt by in-laws (yes=1,no=0)  0.005  0.070  2391 
Ever hurt by other than family (yes=1,no=0)  0.033  0.179  2391 
Variables from the core DHS questionnaire       
Woman has no say on own health care (yes=1,no=0)  0.371  0.483  5083 
Woman has no say on making large household  
purchases (yes=1,no=0) 
0.392  0.488  5093 
Woman has no say on making household  
purchases for daily needs (yes=1,no=0) 
0.302  0.459  5097 
Woman has no say on visits to family  
or relatives (yes=1,no=0) 
0.230  0.421  5061 
Woman has no say on food to be cooked each day (yes=1,no=0)  0.091  0.287  5094 
Husband's years of education  4.259  3.680  4970 
Husband has higher educational attainment than wife 
(yes=1,no=0) 
0.336  0.472  5100 
Husband's occupation is non agriculture (yes=1,no=0)  0.242  0.428  4991 
Age difference between husband and wife  4.977  5.916  4679 
Variables from the men’s interview       
Husband thinks that domestic violence is justified (yes=1,no=0)  0.339  0.769  1721 
Notes: Data from the 2005 DHS. 
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Table 3 Difference-in-differences Analysis: Main Result 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dependent variable  Parent violence  Physical violence in the last 12 months 
Genocide intensity×  
Married after genocide 
           
0.0089  0.0497**  0.0510**  0.0563**  0.0550**  0.0501* 
  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.029) 
             
Observations  2,742  1,987  1,987  1,987  1,987  1,987 
R-squared  0.0010  0.0207  0.1334  0.1365  0.1444  0.1535 
Individual Controls  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Commune FE  NO  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year of marriage FE  NO  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Commune Controls  YES  NO  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Province specific linear trend  NO  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO 
Province × time of marriage FE  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  YES 
Mean of dependent variable  0.332  0.190  0.190  0.190  0.190  0.190 
Notes: Data from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. All regressions are estimated using an OLS model and 
weighted using survey weights. Robust standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by commune of residence. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05 * p<0.1. In column 1, widowed women and women who married more than once are included in the sample, which 
explains why the sample size is larger compared to the other columns in the table. Regressions in columns 1 and 2 control for the 
genocide index and a dummy for becoming married after the genocide. Individual controls in columns 2-6 include age dummies, 
religion, age at marriage, education, partner's education, urban status and a wealth index. Commune controls are obtained from 
1991 and 2002 Rwanda Census; they include population density and literacy rate. 
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Table 4 Reduced Form Using Year of Birth and Two-Stage Least-Squares (2SLS) 
Dependent variable: Physical violence in the last 12 months  (1)  (2) 
 
Reduced Form  2SLS 
Genocide intensity× Younger than 21 in 1994  0.0390* 
 
 
(0.021) 
  Genocide intensity× Married after genocide 
 
0.0506* 
   
(0.028) 
First marriage after the end of genocide - July 1994 
 
0.0241 
   
(0.024) 
Genocide intensity 
 
-0.0314* 
   
(0.018) 
Constant  0.1446***  0.1420*** 
 
(0.052)  (0.052) 
      Observations  1,987  1,987 
R-squared  0.0132  0.0137 
First-stage statistics     
F stat for (Genocide× Married After) 
 
851 
F stat for (Genocide× Married After) Critical Value 
 
618.8 
F stat (Married After) 
 
253.9 
F stat (Married After) Critical Value 
 
1119 
Notes: Data from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. All regressions are estimated using an 
OLS model and weighted using survey weights. Robust standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by commune of 
residence. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All regressions include religion, education, partner's education, urban 
status and a wealth index. Regression in column (2) is estimated using a Two-Stage Least-Squares model. In 
column (2) “Younger than 21 in 1994” is used as instrumental variable for “Married after  genocide”; the 
interaction of “Genocide index” and “Younger than 21 in 1994” is used as an  instrumental variable for the 
interaction of “Genocide index” and “Married after genocide”. The results of the first-stage analysis are available 
upon request. 
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Table 5 Background Characteristics of Married Women 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Variable  Years of education  Height (cm) 
Genocide intensity× Married after genocide  0.0994**  0.1603*  -3.6592  -5.0813 
  (0.045)  (0.082)  (3.666)  (6.162) 
Sample  DHS  DV  DHS  DV 
Observations  5,745  2,075  2,840  2,076 
R-squared  0.8058  0.8038  0.0893  0.1789 
Mean of dependent variable  3.793  3.796  166.3  165.8 
Notes: Data from domestic violence module and the core questionnaire of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. All regressions 
are estimated using OLS  model and weighted using survey weights.  Robust standard errors in parenthesis are 
clustered by commune of residence *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 All regressions include commune fixed effects, 
year of marriage fixed effects, commune literacy rate, commune population density, age dummies, religion, age at 
marriage, education, partner's education, urban status and a wealth index. The DHS sample includes women who 
received the core DHS questionnaire. The DV sample is a subset of the DHS sample and it includes women who 
received the domestic violence module. 
 
 
 
Table 6 Sex ratio, Genocide and Spousal Violence 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable  Physical violence in the last 12 months 
Sex Ratio  -0.2951    -0.1238   
  (0.310)    (0.318)   
Sex Ratio, exclude individuals in prison    -1.0197***    -0.8341** 
    (0.298)    (0.342) 
Genocide intensity× Married after genocide      0.0536**  0.0329 
      (0.025)  (0.026) 
Observations  1,987  1,987  1,987  1,987 
R-squared  0.1354  0.1402  0.1382  0.1411 
Notes: Data from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. All regressions are estimated using an 
OLS model and weighted using survey weights. Robust standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by commune 
of residence *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All regressions include commune fixed effects, year of marriage 
fixed effects, commune literacy rate, commune population density, age dummies, religion, age at marriage, 
education, partner's education, urban status and a wealth index. The sex ratio is defined according to equation (2). 
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Table 7 Sex ratio, Genocide and Women's Decision-making Power within the Household 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Dependent variable  Woman has no say on: 
   her own 
health 
large 
purchases 
daily 
purchases 
family 
visits 
food 
Panel A Effect of Genocide           
Genocide intensity× Married after genocide  0.0435**  0.0362**  0.0334**  0.0259*  0.0095 
  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.011) 
R-squared  0.1500  0.1244  0.1239  0.1242  0.0962 
Panel B Effect of Sex Ratio  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Sex Ratio, exclude people in prison  -0.1628  -0.1002  -0.0435  -0.1439  -0.2186* 
  (0.200)  (0.221)  (0.210)  (0.183)  (0.115) 
R-squared  0.1486  0.1234  0.1230  0.1237  0.0966 
Panel C Effect of Genocide and Sex Ratio  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Genocide intensity× Married after genocide  0.0428**  0.0363**  0.0345**  0.0246*  0.0057 
  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.011) 
Sex Ratio, exclude people in prison  -0.0360  0.0074  0.0594  -0.0708  -0.2015* 
  (0.201)  (0.221)  (0.208)  (0.177)  (0.121) 
Observations  4,590  4,598  4,602  4,575  4,599 
R-squared  0.1500  0.1244  0.1239  0.1242  0.0967 
Mean of dependent variable  0.403  0.426  0.328  0.251  0.102 
Notes: Data from the core questionnaire of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. All regressions are estimated using an OLS 
model and weighted using survey weights. Robust standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by commune of 
residence *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 All regressions include commune fixed effects, year of marriage fixed 
effects, age dummies, religion, age at marriage, education, partner's education, urban status and a wealth index. 
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Table 8 Husband's Characteristics 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Dependent variable  Husband's 
years of 
education 
Husband  
has more 
education 
Husband has non-
agricultural 
occupation 
Age gap 
between 
spouses 
Husband thinks 
domestic violence 
is justified 
Genocide 
intensity× 
-0.0039  -0.0035  -0.0095  -0.2014  0.0074 
Married after 
genocide 
(0.098)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.183)  (0.049) 
           
Observations  5,658  5,857  5,737  4,647  1,706 
R-squared  0.3107  0.1837  0.2985  0.1080  0.1545 
Mean of dependent 
variable 
4.270  0.340  0.270  5.030  0.342 
Notes: Data from the core questionnaire of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. All regressions are estimated using an OLS 
model and weighted using survey weights. Robust standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by commune of 
residence *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 All regressions include commune fixed effects, year of marriage fixed 
effects, age dummies, religion, age at marriage, education, partner's education, urban status and a wealth index. 
 
 
 
Table 9 Ever a Victim of Violence by Individuals Other than Partner 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Dependent variable  Ever 
hurt by 
family 
member 
Ever 
hurt by 
in-laws 
Ever 
hurt by 
other 
than 
family 
Ever hurt 
by other 
than 
partner 
Physical 
violence in 
last 12 
months 
Genocide intensity× Married after genocide  0.0004  -0.0039  -0.0065  -0.0110  0.0267 
  (0.008)  (0.003)  (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.075) 
Husband’s Age          -0.0027 
          (0.002) 
Genocide intensity× Married after genocide          0.0009 
× Husband's age          (0.002) 
           
Observations  2,325  2,325  2,325  2,325  1,881 
R-squared  0.1089  0.0759  0.1591  0.1418  0.1403 
Mean of dependent variable  0.0206  0.00645  0.0280  0.0529  0.0529 
Notes: Data from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. Widowed women and women who 
married more than once are included in the sample. All regressions are estimated using an OLS model and 
weighted using survey weights. Robust standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by commune of residence *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.  All regressions include commune fixed effects, year of marriage fixed effects, 
commune literacy rate, commune population density, age dummies, religion, age at marriage, education, partner's 
education, urban status and a wealth index. 42 
 
 
 
Figures  
Figure 1 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
Quartile 4
Quartile 3
Quartile 2
Quartile 1
No data
The unit of the analysis is the commune
Quartiles of Genocide Index (PCA)
Genocide intensity43 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
Figure 4 
 
   
0
2
4
6
8
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
.5 1 1.5
Sex ratio = Number of men age 20-54/Number of women age 15-49
Sex ratio 1991
Sex ratio 2002
Source: 1991 and 2002 Census of Rwandan population; the unit of analysis is the commune.
Sex Ratio
0
2
4
6
8
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
.4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4
Sex ratio = Number of men age 20-54/Number of women age 15-49
Sex ratio 1991
Sex ratio 2002
Source: 1991 and 2002 Census of Rwandan population; the unit of analysis is the commune.
Sex ratio (exclude incarcerated individuals)44 
 
 
 
Appendix 
A.  Robustness 
I.  Controls for Age 
The empirical strategy of this research relies on comparing intimate partner violence 
outcomes in women who married at different points in time. Women who married before the 
genocide and women who married after the end of the killings could be different in several 
dimensions.  For instance, women who married before the genocide tended to be older. The 
baseline specification controls for women’s age using dummies that measure age bins of 5 years. 
For robustness, I include dummies that measure age using bins of 10 or 15 years (born in 1955-
1964, born in 1965-1974, born in 1975-1990), or year-of-birth fixed effects. Additionally, I 
estimate the difference-in-differences regression, restricting the analysis to women within the 
common support of the age variable.
51 Panel A of Table A2 shows that the results are robust to 
alternative specifications of the age variable  (Columns 1 and 2), and to the exclusion of 
observations that are not in the common support group  (Column 3).  This helps to relieve 
concerns that the difference-in-differences estimates may capture differences in unobservable 
characteristics between younger and older women rather than the effect of the genocide.  
II.  Migration 
Columns 4 and 5 present the estimate for the effect of genocide intensity on intimate 
partner violence when I exclude households and women who did not migrate from the sample. In 
column 4, I restrict the sample to “non-migrant households,” defined as households where the 
woman (or her husband) is still living in her or his province of birth in 2005. In column 5, I 
restrict the sample further to “non-migrant women,” defined as women who are still living in 
their province of birth in 2005. The estimated coefficient is larger in magnitude when I restrict 
                                                 
51 Specifically, among women who married before the genocide, I exclude those who are older than the 
oldest woman who married after the genocide; among women who married after the genocide, I excluded 
those who are younger than the youngest woman who married before the genocide. The common support 
group includes women aged 24 to 45 in 2005. 45 
 
 
 
the sample to non-migrants, suggesting that measurement error attenuates the effect of the 
genocide on spousal violence for households and women who migrated. 
III.  Alternative Specifications of the Dependent Variable 
The baseline specification employs an indicator for whether a woman was the victim of 
physical violence by her partner in the last 12 months as dependent variable. Other measures of 
intimate partner violence are available in the DHS data—for example, whether the woman was 
the victim of sexual violence by her current partner in the last 12 months or whether a woman 
has ever been a victim of intimate partner violence. Panel B of Table A2 presents estimates for 
the effect of genocide in intimate partner violence using these alternative measures of intimate 
partner violence. There is no evidence that the genocide affected sexual violence for women who 
married after the genocide (column 1). Similar results are obtained when I restrict the sample to 
non-migrant women or households (columns 2 and 3). The results are robust to using “Ever a 
victim of physical violence” as dependent variable, although the point estimate is not always 
statistically significant (columns 4 and 5). The estimated coefficient is large in magnitude and 
statistically significant at the 1% level when I restrict the sample to non-migrant women (column 
6).
52  
IV.  Misreporting 
Self-reported  data on intimate partner violence are often subject to criticism of 
misreporting.
53 In this paper, misreporting would be an issue if it were more or less likely to 
                                                 
52  “Victim of physical violence in the past 12 months” is preferable to “Ever a victim of physical 
violence” because it minimizes recall bias due to memory loss. In addition, for women who married 
before the genocide, “Ever a victim of physical violence” may take value 1 for episodes of domestic 
violence that happened before the genocide. This is undesirable. 
53  The DHS domestic violence module minimizes misreporting. More precisely, it uses a modified 
Conflict Tactics Scale (CTS) to measure spousal violence. Kishor (2005) describes in detail the CTS 
approach and the modified CTS included in the DHS module. The original CTS developed by Straus 
(1979, 1990) consists of a series of individual questions regarding specific acts of violence such as 
slapping, punching and kicking. If the respondent affirms that any one of the specified acts or outcomes 
has taken place, she is considered to have experienced violence. The CTS approach presents several 
features that are aimed at minimizing underreporting of violence. First, by asking separately about 
specific acts of violence, the violence measure is not affected by different understandings between women 46 
 
 
 
happen in localities where the genocide was more intense. For example, younger women who 
lived in localities where the genocide was more intense could be more likely to underreport 
domestic violence relative to older women and women who live in localities where the genocide 
was less intense. If this were the case, then the estimated coefficient on the interaction term 
between genocide intensity and marrying after the genocide would be biased downward. 
Therefore, underreporting is not a major concern. On the other hand, over-reporting in localities 
with higher genocide intensity may be more worrisome. For  instance, younger women in 
localities  where the genocide was more intense could have been  exposed to public health 
programs that increased women’s awareness of gender-based violence. If this were the case, then 
the estimated coefficient on the interaction term between genocide intensity and marrying after 
the genocide would be biased upward.  
I use information contained in the DHS to test for misreporting. I use three different 
proxies for misreporting behavior: nonresponse, seeking help after being the victim of intimate 
partner  violence  and  attitudes towards domestic violence.  I  expect these variables to be 
correlated with misreporting in the following way: if women are more likely to report intimate 
partner violence to family, friends, acquaintances or the police then they should also be more 
likely to report it to the interviewer (Chin 2013). In other words, seeking help after intimate 
partner violence could be correlated with over-reporting. On the contrary, underreporting 
behavior should be positively correlated with nonresponse. Finally, if women are more aware of 
gender-based violence issues and are more likely to report intimate partner violence, I might also 
expect them to report less that domestic violence is justified (Heath 2012). 
The  three different proxies for misreporting are used as dependent variables in the 
difference-in-differences strategy described in equation (1). The results are presented in Panel C 
of Table A2. Columns 1 to 3 report the results for seeking help after becoming victim of intimate 
                                                                                                                                                             
of what constitutes violence. Second, the CTS approach gives respondents multiple opportunities to 
disclose their experiences of violence. The original scale developed by Straus had 19 items (Straus 1979, 
1990) and did not include sexual violence. The modified list used by DHS includes only about 15 acts of 
physical and sexual violence. 47 
 
 
 
partner violence. Unfortunately, the small sample size does not allow for the drawing  of 
conclusive evidence. If anything, women who married after the genocide in localities where the 
genocide was more intense are less likely to seek help after being the victim of intimate partner 
violence. Column 4 shows that the genocide did not affect nonresponse rate; the coefficient is 
small in magnitude and has a negative sign. Column 5 presents the results for women’s attitudes 
toward intimate partner violence.  There is  no evidence that women who married after the 
genocide and live in high-genocide communes are less likely to believe that domestic violence is 
justified. The interaction term between genocide intensity and marrying after the genocide is 
small and statistically insignificant. Overall, the results provide no evidence that the genocide 
increased misreporting for women who married after the genocide compared to women who 
married before. 
B.  Retrospective Panel Analysis 
The 2005 DHS contains self-reported information on the timing of the first episode of 
intimate partner violence, which I use to impute a woman’s history of domestic violence using 
two different methods. In the first imputation method, I assume that spousal violence occurred 
every year after the year of the first episode. In the second imputation method, I assume that 
domestic violence occurred every year after the first episode only if it also occurred in the last 12 
months. As a result of the data imputation, I obtain an unbalanced retrospective panel. A woman 
enters the data set when she becomes married; then she is observed every year until the year of 
the survey (2005). I examine the impact of the genocide on the probability of experiencing 
spousal violence by estimating the following equation: 
𝑌 𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝗽0 + 𝗽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝗽2𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑐 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝗿 + 𝗼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐     (4) 
In this specification, the dependent variable 𝑌 𝑖𝑐𝑡 denotes whether woman i in commune c 
experienced spousal violence in calendar year t. Postt is an indicator that takes value 1 for each 
calendar year after 1994. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of time-varying individual characteristics, such as age 
and marital duration.  αi  represents an individual fixed effect. It  accounts for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity that makes an individual more (or less) vulnerable to spousal violence. 48 
 
 
 
The coefficient of interest is 𝗽2, which captures the mean effect on spousal violence of being 
exposed to the genocide. This sample includes only surviving women who married before the 
outbreak of the genocide and whose marriage is still intact in 2005.  
Table A5 reports the results of the retrospective panel analysis. In columns 1, 2 and 3, I 
define the dependent variable using the first imputation method. In columns 4, 5 and 6, I define 
the dependent variable using the second method of imputation. The coefficient estimate on the 
interaction term (β2) is small and statistically insignificant in all the specifications. The results  
are robust including commune-fixed effects and women-fixed effects.     
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Table A1 Two-step Heckman Selection Model 
Dependent Variable: Physical violence in the last 12 months  (1) 
Selection equation    
Number of younger sisters  0.0801*** 
 
(0.018) 
Genocide index× Younger than 21 in 1994  -0.0280 
 
(0.064) 
Genocide index  -0.0861 
 
(0.053) 
Younger than 21 in 1994  -0.1643 
 
(0.204) 
    Two-step estimator 
  Genocide index× Younger than 21 in 1994  0.0435* 
 
(0.024) 
Genocide index  -0.0209 
 
(0.017) 
Younger than 21 in 1994  -0.0122 
 
(0.062) 
Observations  2,422 
Lambda  0.0458 
Lambda std. error  0.156 
Notes: Data from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. Never 
married women are included in the sample. Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
are clustered by commune of residence *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All 
regressions include age dummies, religion, age at marriage, education, partner's 
education, urban status and a wealth index.  
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Table A2 Difference-in-differences Analysis: Robustness Checks 
Panel A Age controls, migration  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)   
Dependent variable  Physical violence in the last 12 months   
Genocide intensity× Married after genocide  0.0499**  0.0513**  0.0463*  0.0648***  0.0687*   
  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.036)   
Observations  1,987  1,987  1,547  1,436  827   
R-squared  0.0184  0.0387  0.0244  0.0237  0.0265   
Age dummies or sample  10 years  Year of birth  Common support  5 years  5 years   
Mean of dependent variable  0.190  0.190  0.190  0.190  0.190   
Migration sample  All women  All women  All women  Non-migrant 
   
Non-migrant  
 
 
Panel B Other Dependent Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dependent variable  Sexual violence in the last 12 months  Ever a victim of physical violence 
Genocide intensity× Married after genocide  -0.0059  -0.0038  -0.0057  0.0209  0.0436  0.0821** 
  (0.016)  (0.021)  (0.030)  (0.027)  (0.031)  (0.036) 
Observations  2,030  1,465  851  2,076  1,492  876 
R-squared  0.0147  0.0170  0.0267  0.0442  0.0503  0.0476 
Migration sample  All women  Non-migrant  
 
Non-migrant  
 
All women  Non-migrant  
 
Non-migrant  
  Mean of dependent variable  0.0975  0.101  0.102  0.336  0.348  0.398 
Panel C Reporting and Attitudes  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)   
Dependent variable  Seeking help  Seeking help 
   
Seeking help 
   
 
Nonresponse  Wife-beating  
 
 
Genocide intensity× Married after genocide  -0.0677  -0.0809  -0.0196  -0.0093  0.0140   
  (0.052)  (0.064)  (0.079)  (0.025)  (0.016)   
Observations  764  764  335  2,325  5,748   
R-squared  0.3559  0.3118  0.5308  0.2536  0.1269   
Mean of dependent variable  0.438  0.342  0.779  0.107  0.465   
Notes: Data from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. All regressions are estimated using an OLS model and weighted using survey 
weights. Robust standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by commune of residence *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All regressions include age dummies, 
religion, age at marriage, education, partner's education, urban status and a wealth index. Regressions in Panel A and Panel B include the genocide index and a 
dummy for becoming married after the genocide. Regressions in Panel C also include commune fixed effects, year of marriage fixed effects, commune literacy 
rate and population density. 51 
 
 
 
Table A3 Probit Regression 
Dependent variable  Married after genocide 
Protestant  0.0331 
  (0.233) 
Catholic  0.1140 
  (0.233) 
Number of siblings  -0.0071 
  (0.016) 
Grew up in a city  0.7167*** 
  (0.233) 
Grew up in a city is missing  -0.0220 
  (0.088) 
Observations  1,639 
Year of birth dummies  YES 
Notes: Data from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda  
2005 DHS. The regression is estimated using a probit model.  
Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. 
The regression includes dummies for year of birth. 
 
 
 
Table A4 Sex ratio, Conflict and Spousal Violence: Alternative Measure of Sex Ratio 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable  Physical violence in the last 12 months 
Sex Ratio (discontinuous measure)  -0.2367    -0.1012   
  (0.203)    (0.204)   
Sex Ratio, exclude people in prison  
(discontinuous measure) 
  -0.7216***    -0.5606** 
    (0.232)    (0.258) 
Genocide intensity× Married after genocide      0.0527**  0.0321 
      (0.027)  (0.027) 
Observations  1,987  1,987  1,987  1,987 
R-squared  0.1341  0.1378  0.1366  0.1386 
Notes: Data from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. All regressions are estimated using an 
OLS model and weighted using survey weights. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by commune of 
residence *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All regressions include commune fixed effects, year of marriage fixed 
effects, commune literacy rate, commune population density, age dummies, religion, age at marriage, education, 
partner's education, urban status and a wealth index. The sex ratio is defined as sex ratio = I(year of 
marriage>1994)*Sex ratio2002+[1- I(year of marriage>1994)]*Sex ratio1991. 
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Table A5 Retrospective Panel Analysis 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dependent variable  Domestic violence: 
Imputation method 1 
Domestic violence: 
Imputation method 2 
              
Genocide index× Calendar year 
after 1994 
0.0054  -0.0025  -0.0049  0.0019  -0.0026  -0.0078 
  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.013)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.012) 
Genocide index  -0.0051      0.0008     
  (0.006)      (0.005)     
Calendar year after 1994  0.0286**      0.0320***     
  (0.014)      (0.011)     
             
Observations  16,649  16,649  16,649  16,463  16,463  16,463 
R-squared  0.0778  0.2611  0.2028  0.0331  0.1935  0.0575 
Individual controls  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Commune FE  NO  YES  NO  NO  YES  NO 
Woman FE  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  YES 
Calendar year FE  NO  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES 
Mean of dependent variable  0.311  0.311  0.311  0.160  0.160  0.160 
Number of women      846      846 
Notes: Data from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. One observation is a woman in a 
calendar year. All regressions are estimated using an OLS model and weighted using survey weights.  Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by commune of residence *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Individual 
controls include age dummies, religion, years since marriage entered as a cubic,  age at marriage, education, 
partner's education, urban status and a wealth index. Imputation method 1 uses an imputed measure of domestic 
violence that takes value one when the first episode of domestic violence occurs and in all the following years. 
Imputation method 2 uses an imputed measure of domestic violence that takes value 1 when the first year of 
domestic violence occurs; it takes value 1 in all the subsequent years only if domestic violence also occurred in the 
last 12 months before the survey. 
 
 